arXiv AI
Jun 16
The Proxy Knows Too Much: Sealing LLM API Routers with Attested TEEs
arXiv:2606. 16358v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agents increasingly access large language models (LLMs) through API routers.
Grimlock: Guarding High-Agency Systems with eBPF and Attested Channels
arXiv:2605. 27488v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic systems increasingly run user-authored orchestration code that invokes tools, spawns subtasks, and delegates work across machines and clouds.
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arXiv AI
Jun 11
Sovereign Assurance Boundary: Certificate-Bound Admission for Agentic Infrastructure
arXiv:2606. 11632v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic infrastructure introduces a critical control-plane authorization problem: non-deterministic reasoning systems can propose high-stakes mutations to production resources, yet existing security mechanisms -- such as identity and access management (IAM), policy engines, consensus protocols, and audit logs -- either enforce static, context-unaware permissions or merely record actions post-execution.
arXiv AI
Jun 19
Sovereign Execution Brokers: Enforcing Certificate-Bound Authority in Agentic Control Planes
arXiv:2606. 20520v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous agents are increasingly connected to cloud, deployment, and data-control workflows, but production mutation authority should not reside inside non-deterministic reasoning processes.
arXiv AI
Aug 7
Hardware Keystores for AI Agent Signing Workflows: A Zero-Trust MCP Enforcement Architecture
arXiv:2608. 06130v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents performing cryptographic operations (signing Git commits, authenticating API calls, issuing certificates) currently store private keys in software-accessible locations: plaintext files, environment variables, or container memory.
arXiv AI
2d ago
Mandato: Protocol-Level Enforcement of Digitally Signed Mandates on AI Agent Actions with Cryptographically Chained Audit Trails
arXiv:2608. 14074v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act on external systems through standardized tool-calling protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP), yet no infrastructure layer constrains their actions to what a principal has verifiably authorized: authorization logic lives in application code, is neither signed nor independently auditable, and the resulting logs lack evidentiary value.
arXiv AI
Jul 23
Rewriting the Response Path: Silent Tampering and Provider-Signed Defense in BYOK LLM Agents
arXiv:2605. 02187v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM agents convert model outputs into consequential actions, including communications, code changes, and financial transactions.
arXiv AI
Jun 30
ChainCaps: Composition-Safe Tool-Using Agents via Monotonic Capability Attenuation
arXiv:2605. 26542v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Tool-using agents increasingly operate in open-ended deployment environments, where they compose file systems, web APIs, code interpreters, and enterprise services at runtime.
arXiv AI
Jun 30
From Tool Connection to Execution Control: Benchmarking Security Invariants in MCP-Style Agent Runtimes
arXiv:2606. 29073v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model Context Protocol (MCP)-style ecosystems give language-model applications a practical connection layer for tools, resources, prompts, and transports.
arXiv AI
Jun 30
Proof-of-Guardrail in AI Agents and What (Not) to Trust from It
arXiv:2603. 05786v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI agents become widely deployed as online services, users often rely on an agent developer's claim about how safety is enforced, which introduces a threat where safety measures are falsely advertised.
arXiv AI
Jul 28
Decentralized Granular Access Control for Agentic AI Systems in Critical Infrastructure
arXiv:2607. 22611v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of autonomous AI agents in production infrastructure introduces fundamental security challenges that traditional role-based access control (RBAC) models cannot address.
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 23
Red-Teaming the Agentic Red-Team
The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability. However, while the community has focused on creating more and more capable agents, less attention has been allocated to assessing the security of those systems.
arXiv AI
2d ago
Agentao: A Governed Local-First Runtime for Tool-Using LLM Agents
arXiv:2608. 13574v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly operate as execution systems that invoke tools, modify local state, use persistent memory, and interact with external protocols.