Analytic Abduction: Causal Decomposition and Governed Commitment for Human--AI Coordination
arXiv:2607. 14641v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Abductive reasoning operates in two directions.
arXiv:2606. 29175v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: International humanitarian law protects civilians from direct attack unless and for such time as they take direct part in hostilities, with the ICRC's 2009 Interpretive Guidance operationalising this rule through a three-criterion cumulative test.
arXiv:2607. 14641v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Abductive reasoning operates in two directions.
arXiv:2607. 29405v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI systems act through multi-step trajectories that combine planning, tool use, memory, interaction, and adaptation.
arXiv:2607. 20255v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-driven autonomous agents are reshaping offensive security.
The paper proposes AI Deployment Accountability Engineering (ADAE), a new subdiscipline focused on establishing measurable, continuous, and actionable accountability for AI systems once they are deployed. ADAE treats accountability as a deployment-layer property, aiming to ensure systems remain within acceptable risk limits, identify failure contexts, attribute failures across technical and human components, and translate technical failures into downstream consequences. The authors outline a research agenda built around four pillars—structured discovery of context-dependent failure modes, privacy-preserving accountability measurement, system-level risk analysis for agentic AI, and translation of technical failures into operational and institutional risks—to support timely intervention in safety-critical socio-technical environments.
arXiv:2608. 10601v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Two instruments of EU digital law place inference at their centre and mean different things by it.
The paper examines how agentic AI systems intended for military command and control are tested and evaluated. It reviews 240 testing practices across eight dimensions and three lifecycle stages, uncovering eight assumptions—grouped into system specifiability, stability, composability, and supervisability—whose validity is weakened by agentic properties. Consequently, test results may meet procedural standards but do not guarantee that fielded behavior matches tested behavior, leading the authors to propose ten assurance claims and suggest that uncertainty be managed through deployment‑time monitoring and defined expiry conditions.
arXiv:2607. 02955v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We argue that AI systems used in conducting foreign policy tasks - broadly enacting 'statecraft' - should be a priority test case for technical AI governance research.
arXiv:2606. 28863v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI systems increasingly exhibit behavior that differs systematically between evaluation and deployment contexts.
Two instruments of EU digital law place inference at their centre and mean different things by it. Article 3(1) of the AI Act uses the capability to infer constitutively: it is the central feature separating the regulated category from conventional software.
arXiv:2606. 18532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI systems are increasingly evaluated in bounded environments that combine isolation, simulation, instrumentation, supervision, and evidence capture.
arXiv:2609.13731v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The transition from passive foundation models to autonomous, goal-directed agentic AI systems has introduced unprecedented capabilities by coupling rec...
arXiv:2608. 12104v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The increasing deployment of autonomous, agentic AI systems challenges traditional accountability mechanisms.