arXiv:2607. 19742v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) reports richly describe real-world attack processes, but their unstructured narratives cannot be directly used for automated attack-path reasoning.
By Wenbo Hou, Ning Hu, Xueping Wang, Jiahao Gu, Wenjian Luo
arXiv:2606. 15123v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We study the task of CVE-conditioned exploit generation, where a model drafts proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits given software vulnerability context.
By Yiwei Chen, Lichi Li, Kai Cheung, Vinny Parla, Ganesh Sundaram
arXiv:2608. 07808v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Four years after prompt injection was first identified in 2022, attacks are still predominantly documented as verbatim strings rather than structured exploits, despite advancing agent capabilities and threat actors embedding injections to subvert AI-assisted security analysis.
By Jeremy McHugh
arXiv:2606. 31639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models are no longer only text generators.
By Seyed Bagher Hashemi Natanzi, Bo Tang
arXiv:2608.23181v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in coding capabilities, their potential in cybersecurity has drawn increasing research attention,...
By Jian Yang, Haau-Sing Li, Shawn Guo, Zixi Zhao, Yibo Tan, Jiajun Wu, Aishan Liu, Xianglong Liu, Tianyu Zheng, Bryan Dai, Chengran Yang
The paper introduces CodeScan, a black-box, vulnerability-oriented scanning framework designed to detect data poisoning and backdoor attacks in code generation large language models (LLMs). CodeScan operates by analyzing structural similarities across multiple code generations, normalizing them with abstract syntax tree (AST) techniques, and then applying LLM-based vulnerability analysis to identify recurring insecure patterns. Evaluations on 117 models across three architectures and multiple sizes show over 97% detection accuracy with fewer false positives compared to prior methods.
By Shenao Yan, Shan Jin, Shimaa Ahmed, Sunpreet Singh Arora, Yiwei Cai, Yizhen Wang, Yuan Hong
arXiv:2609.24710v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in cybersecurity, where accurate analysis often requires multi-step and context-dependent reasonin...
By Jiling Zhou, Aisvarya Adeseye, Antti Hakkala, Seppo Virtanen, Jouni Isoaho
The paper proposes a neurosymbolic defense architecture for AI-enhanced Security Operations Centers (AI‑SOCs) that protects against indirect prompt injection via log poisoning. It combines deterministic SIEM decoders as a pre‑filter with NeMo Guardrails for semantic validation, and adds a closed‑loop telemetry system for Human‑in‑the‑Loop visibility. Experimental results mapped to the MITRE ATLAS taxonomy show the approach effectively dismantles promptware kill chains and delivers a resilient, observable defense for next‑generation AI‑SOCs.
By Anna Gazani, Spyridon Kounoupidis, Panagiotis Katsaros, Nikolaos Kekatos, Grigorios Tsoumakas, Georgios Koutidis
arXiv:2510. 14113v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are transforming everyday applications, yet deployment in cybersecurity lags due to a lack of high-quality, domain-specific models and training datasets.
By Matan Levi, Daniel Ohayon, Ariel Blobstein, Ravid Sagi, Ian Molloy, Yair Allouche
arXiv:2606. 04769v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a critical standard empowering Large Language Models (LLMs) to utilize external tools.
By Yutao Shi, Xiaohan Zhang, Xiangjing Zhang, Xihua Shen, Hui Ouyang, Huming Qiu, Mi Zhang, Min Yang
arXiv:2510. 15476v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as interfaces to information, code, and real-world services, making prompt-level security failures a practical concern.
By Hanbin Hong, Shuang Wu, Shuya Feng, Nima Naderloui, Shenao Yan, Jingyu Zhang, Ali Arastehfard, Heqing Huang, Yuan Hong
arXiv:2607. 23088v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used for code generation, yet their security behavior in realistic development workflows remains underexplored.
By Lixun Ma, Ruolong Ma, Bei Wang, Feng Wei, Zhenguang Liu, Lorenzo Cavallaro, Wentao Chen