arXiv Computer Vision

Beyond Generation: Using Multimodal LLMs as Detectors of LLM-Generated Deepfake Facial Images

The paper evaluates whether multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can serve as forensic detectors of deepfake facial images. Six MLLMs—including GPT-4o, GPT-5, GPT-5.2, Gemini 2.5, Gemini 3, and Seed 1.6—were tested on a dataset of 400 images (50 authentic and 350 synthetic) generated by seven leading image models. Results show that several MLLMs achieve high detection accuracy, with GPT-5.2 reaching 97.9% in pairwise comparisons, but the presence of invisible SynthID watermarks can reduce detection performance by about 10% for Gemini.

arXiv Computer Vision
Aug 25

Reduce the Artifacts Bias for More Generalizable AI-Generated Image Detection

The paper proposes Artifact-Complementary Expert Fusion (ACEF), a two‑stage framework that enhances AI‑generated image detection by combining two types of reconstruction artifacts—VAE/DDIM and SRGAN—into aligned synthetic negatives. ACEF first builds artifact‑specific experts using LoRA adaptation on a frozen backbone, then fuses their multi‑layer evidence with Layer‑wise Artifact‑Complementary Fusion (LACF) to mitigate conflicts between artifact manifolds. Experiments on 13 benchmarks show that this approach improves generalizability over existing state‑of‑the‑art methods.

By Yiheng Li, Yang Yang, Wenhao Wang, Zichang Tan, Zecheng Lin, Li Gao, Zhen Lei
arXiv AI
Sep 28

FARE: Forensic Acceptance Region Estimation for Catching Bait-and-Switch Image Generators

FARE (Forensic Acceptance Region Estimation) is a method designed to audit the integrity of AI image generators at deployment time. By training on images from a certified generator, FARE learns generator‑specific forensic features and tightens its acceptance region using hard samples, enabling it to determine whether a new image originates from the enrolled generator. Experiments show that FARE consistently outperforms existing baselines in detecting generator swaps, even when the swapped model is similar or under exact‑model and decision‑only attacks.

By Kai Yao, Marc Juarez
arXiv AI
Sep 30

A Benchmark & Dataset for Detecting AI-Manipulated Visual Evidence in the Court System

arXiv:2609.37783v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Photographic evidence is becoming increasingly vulnerable to forms of alteration and fabrication that existing legal and technical workflows are not...

By Kelly McConvey, Sajad Ebrahimi, Nima Jamali, Jalehsadat Mahdavimoghaddam, Matina Mahdizadeh Sani, Maksym Taranukhin, Wentao Zhang, Jacquelyn Burkell, Yuntian Deng, Karen Eltis, Maura R. Grossman, Vered Shwartz, Ebrahim Bagheri
arXiv Computer Vision
Sep 28

ManiVid: Unified and Explainable Forensic Analysis of Manipulated Videos

ManiVid introduces a unified forensic analysis framework for manipulated videos, combining forgery detection, artifact grounding, and anomaly explanation. The authors release ManiVid-38K, a large dataset of 19K real‑fake video pairs with authenticity labels, forgery masks, and explanations, and a benchmark ManiVidBench with 1K balanced pairs. ManiVidLens, the proposed model, outperforms existing methods in artifact grounding and anomaly explanation while matching state‑of‑the‑art detection accuracy.

By Hengrui Kang, Zhonghao Yan, Yuxuan Yang, Ruoyan Jing, Yuncheng Guo, Hao Chen, Kongming Liang, Zhanyu Ma, Conghui He, Weijia Li
arXiv Computer Vision
Aug 31

Can Tainted Pixels Expose Deepfake Videos?

The paper introduces TaintedPixels, a proactive video‑protection technique that embeds subtle, structured perturbations into the blue channel of facial regions. These perturbations remain invisible in the original video but become noticeable after black‑box manipulation, thereby flagging deepfakes. Experiments on three off‑the‑shelf manipulation tools and two detectors show that TaintedPixels achieves the highest forgery detection rate while keeping visual distortion minimal (LPIPS = 0.0042), and a human study confirms that protected videos are rarely suspected, whereas forgeries from protected sources are identified as fake far more often than those from unprotected sources.

By Juan Hu, Shaojing Fan, Sanjay Saha, Marc Herrera, Terence Sim