The paper introduces Pairwise Likelihood MIA (PL‑MIA), a unified membership inference attack that combines a Gaussian likelihood‑ratio statistic with population calibration and the Cauchy combination test. PL‑MIA generates p‑values from pairwise comparisons between a query point and reference points, then aggregates these continuous signals using the Cauchy test to preserve evidence strength. Experiments show that PL‑MIA surpasses strong baselines, boosting true positive rates by over 25% in low‑false‑positive settings, thereby validating the theoretical advantages of the proposed statistical framework.
By Shengjie Niu, Zebin Yun, Yeheng Ge, Jian Huang
The paper examines the reliability of membership inference attack (MIA) vulnerability evaluation. It identifies two weaknesses: finite‑sample bias from sampling shadow datasets from a fixed superset, and miscalibration when aggregating true positive rates across individuals at very low false positive rates. The authors propose simple fixes that avoid extra computational cost and suggest further improvements with additional computation.
By Joonas J\"alk\"o, Gauri Pradhan, Ossi R\"ais\"a, Antti Honkela
arXiv:2506. 06488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A key tool in developing safe AI models is \emph{data auditing}, i.
By Pratiksha Thaker, Neil Kale, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Virginia Smith
arXiv:2509. 25003v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) against Diffusion Models (DMs) raise pressing privacy concerns by revealing whether a sample was part of the training set.
By Mingxing Rao, Bowen Qu, Daniel Moyer
The paper introduces Word-level Probability MIA (WPMIA), a black-box membership inference attack that estimates word-level generation probabilities via Monte Carlo sampling and local kernel smoothing, then aggregates them into a sequence-level likelihood estimator. By conditioning on different prefixes, WPMIA amplifies distributional differences between member and non-member texts, outperforming existing black-box baselines on open-source LLMs and achieving an average TPR@5%FPR of 42.0 on proprietary models such as GPT‑5‑Chat, Gemini‑2.5‑Flash, and Claude‑4.5‑Haiku.
By Shengjie Niu, Yeheng Ge, Jian Huang
arXiv:2606. 17464v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are a canonical way to assess a machine learning model's privacy properties.
By Jeffrey G. Wang, Jason Wang, Marvin Li, Seth Neel
arXiv:2602. 18934v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) threaten the privacy of machine learning models by revealing whether a specific data point was used during training.
By Abdullah Caglar Oksuz, Anisa Halimi, Erman Ayday
arXiv:2607. 16620v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly deployed to limit membership inference risk in machine-learning systems.
By Rakshit Naidu
arXiv:2608.28934v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Differential privacy (DP) has traditionally been used to provide theoretical upper bounds on an algorithm's stability to changing its training data. In...
By Saloni Modi, Srivi Balaji, Yusong Zhu, Gautam Kamath, Kevin Tian
arXiv:2608. 02480v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: With AI systems gaining more access to individuals' information, it is important to protect privacy when reporting statistical answers.
By Jinwon Sohn, Veronika Ro\v{c}kov\'a
arXiv:2605. 11170v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Noise-based certified machine unlearning currently faces a hard ceiling: the noise magnitude required to certify unlearning typically destroys model utility, particularly for large-scale deletion requests.
By Ahmed Mehdi Inane, Vincent Quirion, Gintare Karolina Dziugaite, Ioannis Mitliagkas
arXiv:2601. 17360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An adversary observing a model's released prediction can infer sensitive attributes of the queried input, or even reconstruct representatives of the model's training data.
By Jiankai Jin, Xiangzheng Zhang, Zhao Liu, Wenzhuo Xu, Dongdong Yang, Deyue Zhang, Quanchen Zou