The paper presents a practical private dense retrieval system that uses learned deep hashing as a private filter to generate a short candidate list for each query. Encrypted reranking and oblivious key transfer protect the exact query and final selection, allowing the system to match full‑corpus retrieval quality with only 200‑500 candidates. Experiments on five zero‑shot corpora and the 2.68M‑passage NQ corpus show minimal latency overhead and strong privacy guarantees.
Hosted retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and semantic search allow users to query valuable provider-held corpora, raising two competing demands: to hide each query and chosen result, yet reveal onl...
Spruce is a system that enables scalable private outsourced retrieval by learning compact binary embeddings and using efficient Hamming-distance computation under a two‑server multi‑party computation protocol. It replaces costly corpus‑wide embedding scoring with a fixed‑radius protocol that avoids multi‑round candidate selection, and introduces private cluster pruning and a one‑core dealer to reduce computation and eliminate OT preprocessing bottlenecks. Across corpora of 383K–5.42M documents, Spruce maintains original search quality while achieving up to 31.5× higher throughput and reducing query times to a few seconds.
Spruce is a system that enables secure, private retrieval of large document collections outsourced to untrusted clouds by learning compact binary embeddings that preserve search quality while drastically reducing computation and communication. It replaces expensive corpus-wide embedding scoring with efficient Hamming-distance calculations under a two-server multi-party computation protocol, and introduces a fixed-radius protocol, private cluster pruning, and a one-core dealer to further cut latency and bandwidth usage. Across corpora ranging from 383K to 5.42M documents, Spruce maintains original search quality, achieving up to 6.7× faster full scans and 22.9× speedups with pruning, while retaining over 94% of the original NDCG.
arXiv:2606. 26373v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings power semantic search and retrieval-augmented generation, but embedding-inversion attacks can reconstruct source text from a vector: when a vector database leaks, the documents behind it leak too.
The paper introduces SHAQ, a defense called Shadow Query Generation that protects document embeddings in vector databases from embedding inversion attacks. SHAQ replaces direct embeddings with diverse shadow queries generated by a language model, thereby decomposing document semantics and decoupling stored embeddings from the original text. Experiments on various IR datasets show that SHAQ significantly lowers recovery rates, defends more tokens than baseline methods, and even improves retrieval utility.
arXiv:2606. 24408v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Assessing the privacy of large language models (LLMs) presents significant challenges.
arXiv:2606. 27976v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Dense embeddings underpin semantic search and RAG, yet a leaked vector store hands much of the underlying text back to whoever holds it.
arXiv:2606. 01413v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: It is crucial for modern on-device AI systems that rely on retrieval-augmented inference to release and share datastores without compromising individual privacy.
arXiv:2606. 18996v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agents are increasingly deployed in document-intensive workflows where sensitive private information is not an edge case but a routine input, e.
arXiv:2608.29111v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Applications such as personalized assistance and proprietary document analysis require large language models (LLMs) to generate outputs from private...
arXiv:2607. 16973v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems increasingly power enterprise LLM applications, yet the vector retrieval layer introduces two underexplored challenges: (1) trained codebook quantizers may expose corpus statistics during index construction, creating a leakage channel in multi-tenant deployments, and (2) post-hoc filtering for tenant isolation degrades recall on selective queries.
arXiv:2608. 09001v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Black-box privacy scores for retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are difficult to interpret unless the audited defense's active pipeline hook is known.