arXiv:2607. 21495v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents are increasingly created inside organizations by non-engineering users through low-code, no-code, and conversational development environments.
arXiv:2608. 07317v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The AI-Native Manifesto envisions large-scale agile software development in which humans increasingly govern intent, risk, and exceptions while agents execute more of the engineering process.
arXiv:2607. 03510v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Enterprise artificial intelligence is moving from experimentation into operational workflows.
arXiv:2606. 04321v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI deployments face a recurring design tension: heavy human oversight limits scale, while broad autonomy outruns accountability.
arXiv:2608. 16411v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are rapidly moving from research prototypes into the core business processes of organizations, but these agents pose deployment risks to security, compliance, and functionality.
arXiv:2607. 10878v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents are evolving from answer engines into persistent teams that use tools, delegate work, learn from experience, and modify the artifacts that shape their future behavior.
arXiv:2607. 02186v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Software development is a complex task that demands cooperation among agents with diverse roles.
arXiv:2605. 12729v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly being used to support network operations (NetOps) and artificial intelligence for IT operations (AIOps), including incident investigation, root-cause analysis, configuration synthesis, and limited self-healing.
arXiv:2602. 16666v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are increasingly deployed to execute important tasks.
The paper proposes AI Deployment Accountability Engineering (ADAE), a new subdiscipline focused on establishing measurable, continuous, and actionable accountability for AI systems once they are deployed. ADAE treats accountability as a deployment-layer property, aiming to ensure systems remain within acceptable risk limits, identify failure contexts, attribute failures across technical and human components, and translate technical failures into downstream consequences. The authors outline a research agenda built around four pillars—structured discovery of context-dependent failure modes, privacy-preserving accountability measurement, system-level risk analysis for agentic AI, and translation of technical failures into operational and institutional risks—to support timely intervention in safety-critical socio-technical environments.
The paper reviews how large language models have evolved into agents that can influence external environments through tool use, interface operation, delegation, state retention, virtual world inhabitation, and robotic control. It critiques the narrative of a single march toward autonomy, distinguishing model competence from system integration, persistence, and safe authority. The authors find that action-interface expansion is well documented, while robust completion, recovery, authorization, and independent verification remain less proven, and they propose a framework of justified delegation to guide future research.
AI coding agents are being adopted at historic speed, yet security and risk concerns remain the primary barrier to scaling agentic AI across organizations. Existing security controls for coding agents are not systematically distributed to engineering teams, and vendor-native solutions introduce ecosystem dependencies that may not suit every deployment context.
arXiv:2605. 10907v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm for AI agents is an "on-the-fly" loop in which agents synthesize plans and execute actions within seconds or minutes in response to user prompts.