arXiv:2608. 06984v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agent harnesses persist state across tasks and sessions through persistent carriers like memory, skills, tools, and shared artifacts.
arXiv:2606. 04425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts.
arXiv:2607. 02514v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI coding agents become more autonomous, they increasingly ship code iteratively, with the codebase persisting across sessions.
arXiv:2608. 09476v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Cowork agents may complete benign tasks while disclosing protected data, manipulating unauthorized state, invocate unauthorized API.
arXiv:2607. 01793v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks.
arXiv:2608. 08471v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deployed LLM safety guardrails are predominantly static: trained once and frozen at release, while new jailbreak techniques and previously un-addressed harmful categories emerge within days, leaving the defense perpetually a step behind.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
arXiv:2608. 12977v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The expanding operational capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents introduce sophisticated security threats.
arXiv:2605. 17986v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools.
arXiv:2607. 26791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
arXiv:2603. 15727v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored.