The paper announces VectraYX‑Vision‑1B, a Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity vision‑language model that uses a natively‑trained visual tower (Qwen2‑VL) and a frozen decoder. The authors report that transplanting the visual tower improves the failing 8‑nibble address field from 0.00 to 0.81 exact, using a coarser token budget than 2×2 tiling, and that a second pre‑registered field shows 63% contamination and is demoted. The model’s B6/B7 tool‑id remains at floor, and code/checkpoints are available on Hugging Face.
arXiv:2608.08477v5 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We build VectraYX-Vision-1B, a sub-2B Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity vision-language model for offline use, and measure what limits its visual groundi...
We present VectraYX-Vision-1B, a sub-2B vision-language model (VLM) for Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity imagery, coupling a frozen SigLIP-so400m encoder to a 1. 04B Spanish/LATAM security decoder via an MLP.
SafeRI proposes an on-demand safety alignment approach for large vision-language models, contrasting with existing always-on methods that globally modify model behavior. The framework uses a lightweight recognizer to evaluate token-level safety during autoregressive generation, gating a LoRA module that only activates when unsafe content is detected. By training the LoRA on unsafe prefixes and safe continuations, SafeRI redirects unsafe generations back to safe responses without perturbing the model’s original reasoning path.
arXiv:2604. 06247v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaks and prompt injections delivered through text or images.
The paper introduces MemJack, a memory‑augmented multi‑agent framework that automatically generates jailbreak attacks on Vision‑Language Models (VLMs) using benign natural images as visual anchors. MemJack discovers visual anchors, camouflages them semantically, evaluates responses, repairs via reflection, and replans dynamically, forming a closed‑loop attack pipeline. The authors also create MemJack‑Bench, a dataset of over 113,000 interactive multimodal jailbreak trajectories, and show that MemJack achieves a 71.48% attack success rate against Qwen3‑VL‑Plus, reaching 90% under extended budgets, outperforming other baselines on natural‑image evaluation.
arXiv:2607. 00174v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present a black-box model-stealing attack that recovers private vision-tokenizer configurations of deployed vision-language models (VLMs), including the visual patch size and input preprocessing pipeline.
The paper presents a preprocessor that recovers and decodes encoded content in vision‑language models to close the decode gap that allows harmful requests to bypass safety classifiers. Evaluated against eleven encoding attacks, the preprocessor raises block rates from 0 % to 67‑90 % but also increases benign over‑refusal, and no configuration achieves an ensemble attack‑success rate below 40 % while keeping benign over‑refusal under 70 %. The study shows that closing one encoding channel merely relocates success rather than eliminating it, highlighting the limits of recovery‑based defenses.
arXiv:2609.35912v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills are shareable packages of procedural instructions, tools, and examples. Multimodal skills additionally include visual references that ag...
arXiv:2608.30750v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) can comply with harmful requests delivered through images, even when their LLM backbones would refuse the same content in...
The paper introduces an end‑to‑end framework for testing image‑triggered command injection on computer‑use agents (CUAs). It demonstrates that a local visual patch can cause verifiable environmental effects through the entire pipeline—from screenshot input, through vision‑language‑model generation, action parsing, to execution—by training and deploying patches on GitHub Pages and a CSDN clone. Across five open‑source or publicly available GUI‑agent or VLM backends, the study reports 84.5% T‑ASR, 47.0% TAPR, and 20.3% E2E‑ASR success rates, with trajectory analysis revealing that some attacks first execute malicious terminal commands before continuing the original task.
arXiv:2607.27910v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Inference time defences against vision language model jailbreaks often subtract a calibrated direction from the residual stream at a chosen decoder...
arXiv:2508. 08521v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly being used in a broad range of applications, bringing their security and behavioral control to the forefront.