arXiv:2607. 08066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior.
By Jennifer Za, Julija Bainiaksina, Nikita Ostrovsky, Tanush Chopra, Victoria Krakovna
arXiv:2606. 25836v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: To better assist users with completing challenging tasks, AI agents mediate communications, access data, and interact with different APIs.
By Hyejun Jeong, Dzung Pham, Amir Houmansadr, Eugene Bagdasarian
arXiv:2609.24801v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in production systems, raising concerns about their exposure to adversarial manipulation throu...
By Fernando Outeda, Gustavo Betarte, Juan Diego Campo, Fiorella Cravero
arXiv:2606. 17478v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As LLMs acquire stronger reasoning capabilities, deceptive behavior becomes an increasingly serious safety concern.
By Kexin Chen, Yi Liu, Haonan Zhang, Yanhui Li, Xinyu Deng, Dongxia Wang
arXiv:2608. 00566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Post-hoc model explainers such as LIME, SHAP, and Integrated Gradients are widely deployed to audit models in high-stakes sensitive domains, including finance, healthcare, and social welfare.
By Niraj Kumar, Harsh Kasyap
The paper identifies a vulnerability in large language models where harmful intent can be hidden within benign narratives, a phenomenon termed Semantic Camouflage. By examining latent activation patterns across several small language model families, the authors discover an "Intent Horizon"—a layer depth where harmful intent representations collapse. They propose Latent Intent Verification (LIV), a lightweight probing defense that detects harmful intent in early layers and outperforms existing guardrails on the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset.
By Md. Hasib Ur Rahman
arXiv:2607. 02121v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic systems become integrated into real-world applications, ensuring their safety and security is critical.
By William Hackett, Peter Garraghan
To better assist users with completing challenging tasks, AI agents mediate communications, access data, and interact with different APIs. Many employers (and even nation-states) already provide their users with this technology.
arXiv:2607. 13081v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion.
By SingGuard Team
arXiv:2609.00351v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues,...
By Robin Haselhorst, Lucie Flek, Florian Mai
arXiv:2606. 09890v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents capable of executing multi-step action trajectories toward a given objective.
By Hainiu Xu, Italo Luis da Silva, Jiangnan Ye, Yuhao Wang, Wei Liu, Linyi Yang, Jonathan Richard Schwarz, Nicola Paoletti, Yulan He, Hanqi Yan
arXiv:2604. 08169v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization.
By Niklas Herbster, Martin Zborowski, Alberto Tosato, Gauthier Gidel, Tommaso Tosato