The paper introduces an autonomous AI security agent designed to detect multi‑vector fraud and anti‑money‑laundering (AML) threats in both retail and corporate banking. It operates across two parallel event streams—transactions and sessions—using a fusion of LSTM behaviour models, statistical velocity monitors, and graph‑based account‑counterparty analysis. Experiments on a synthetic dataset show the agent outperforms rule‑based and LSTM‑only baselines, achieving F1 scores of 0.787 for transactions and 0.867 for sessions, while also providing rapid, low‑latency responses and supporting customer verification and analyst assistance.
By Joseph Walusimbi, Joshua Benjamin Ssentongo
arXiv:2607. 13469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The banking sector increasingly relies on automated systems to monitor electronic transactions for signs of fraud, yet conventional rule-based approaches struggle with high false-positive rates and offer no justification for their outputs, limiting their utility for compliance teams.
By Anupa Lodhi
The paper introduces the Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB), a benchmark for measuring fraud in AI agents that autonomously spend money. It presents a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud, a dataset of twenty fraud classes derived from real production data, and an open‑source detector stack called gordonguard for auditing and replaying hostile counterparties. The study shows that current reasoning layers and security scanners perform poorly on many classes, highlighting the need for better detection mechanisms.
By Ankit Srivastava, Debjyoti Paul
arXiv:2608. 07471v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This study considers the task of applying artificial intelligence to recognize bank fraud.
By Bohdan Mytnyk, Oleksandr Tkachyk, Nataliya Shakhovska, Solomiia Fedushko, Yuriy Syerov
arXiv:2606. 08146v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fraud detection in payment, e-commerce, and telecommunications systems requires accuracy at the individual level, robustness under severe class imbalance, and ease of understanding for risk managers.
By Yichen Chen, Siying Li, Yuhang Liang, Lijun Wang, Renyang Liu
arXiv:2606. 17555v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Banks simultaneously face signature-based fraud (card-not-present attacks, account takeover, ATM cloning) and behavioural financial crime (structuring, layering, mule networks, business email compromise) -- two threat families with fundamentally different detection requirements.
By Joseph Walusimbi, Joshua Benjamin Ssentongo
arXiv:2607. 11707v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Following the rapid progress of generative Artificial Intelligence, there is a growing threat posed by conversational scams.
By Ahmed Omar Salim Adnan, Yogananda Manjunath, Shivanjali Khare
arXiv:2608.24551v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Machine learning models are widely used in financial fraud and credit-risk detection, yet their adversarial robustness remains difficult to evaluate...
By Xitong Zeng, Zhaoge Bi, Yitian Yang, Huaming Chen, Quan Z. Sheng
arXiv:2610.17523v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: With recent developments in Artificial Intelligence (AI), the adoption of distributed learning paradigms such as Federated Learning (FL) has emerged....
By Maria-Ioana-Andrea Ivan, Orhan Ermis, Ruxandra F. Olimid
ScamWorld is an interactive environment that recreates reported scam websites across various scenarios, fraud mechanisms, and languages, allowing researchers to observe fraud indicators before a web agent’s final action. The platform enables controlled, repeatable evaluation of web agents, which are increasingly used to browse, shop, and manage accounts on the open web. A study of six leading LLM-powered agents revealed deception rates between 11% and 35%, with agents more likely to proceed with payments than to provide credentials or wallet information, and some agents continuing after recognizing suspicious conditions.
By Yutao Wu, Xiao Liu, Ming Wen, Hanxun Huang, Jun Wang, Xingjun Ma
arXiv:2605.18991v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: We take the position that agent security must be approached as a systems problem: the AI model powering the agent must be treated as an untru...
By Mihai Christodorescu, Earlence Fernandes, Ashish Hooda, Somesh Jha, Johann Rehberger, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Xiaohan Fu, Khawaja Shams, Guy Amir, Jihye Choi, Sarthak Choudhary, Nils Palumbo, Andrey Labunets, Nishit V. Pandya
FraudBench is a new benchmark that tests policy‑grounded banking conversational agents against adaptive fraud scenarios. It uses a dual‑control framework and a 698‑document internal policy corpus, presenting 150 adversarial scenarios (107 public, 43 held‑out) that require agents to manage mutable account state and tool access while preventing identity, authorization, and trust manipulation. Preliminary results on four agents show attack‑security rates between 49% and 65%, highlighting weaknesses in money‑mule and first‑party fraud detection.
By Dheeraj Mohandas Pai, Lu Xian