arXiv:2607. 09744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Least privilege, the principle that an identity should hold only the permissions strictly required for its task, has been a foundational primitive of access control for decades.
arXiv:2606. 03518v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur.
arXiv:2606. 12320v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise security was built to govern data boundaries: the protected surface was data at rest and in transit, and the controls -- access control, data-loss prevention, perimeter inspection -- governed crossings of that boundary.
arXiv:2607. 22611v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of autonomous AI agents in production infrastructure introduces fundamental security challenges that traditional role-based access control (RBAC) models cannot address.
arXiv:2607. 23438v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems increasingly exhibit agentic behavior, discussions of autonomy often conflate what systems are technically capable of doing with what they should be permitted to do in practice.
arXiv:2608. 15888v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents.
The paper evaluates a task-based permission scoping architecture for AI agents, comparing a fine‑tuned RoBERTa‑large encoder to few‑shot Claude Haiku 4.5 on a 600‑prompt dataset. It shows the new system achieves comparable macro‑F1 (0.881 vs. 0.886) and higher precision (0.897 vs. 0.842), while reducing severity‑weighted residual risk from 1.12 to 0.63. The study also introduces an attack‑surface elimination metric, demonstrating that task‑granular control can close 84.4% of the severity‑weighted surface, far surpassing role‑based ceilings alone.
arXiv:2606. 22916v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they read private data, construct structured payloads, submit write requests, export records, and coordinate workflows across application boundaries.
arXiv:2606. 15563v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems increasingly delegate decisions to specialized models, evaluators, tools, and supervisory controllers.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2607. 17225v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI systems do not just predict or recommend; they plan, maintain state, and act in external environments with varying degrees of autonomy.
arXiv:2610.00371v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent systems derive their capabilities from sharing evidence, delegating tasks, and combining information across agents. The same process crea...
AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they read private data, construct structured payloads, submit write requests, export records, and coordinate workflows across application boundaries. Existing authorization mechanisms usually ask whether an integration credential, app, or token can call a tool.