arXiv:2608. 11392v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-running agents periodically compact their context, replacing the transcript with a model-generated summary.
arXiv:2606. 22528v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Modern LLM agents increasingly rely on context compaction, summarization, or eviction to keep long-running sessions within a token budget.
arXiv:2608. 16852v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Regulatory compliance monitoring in deployed language models is increasingly implemented as a legal and audit control, checking model outputs against written rules spanning data protection, healthcare, financial regulation, and platform policy.
arXiv:2608.29028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems often coordinate by compressing an upstream interaction into a handoff artifact that downstream agents treat as shared state. W...
The paper demonstrates that safety mechanisms for autonomous large language model agents fail to compose across iterative loops, as trajectory‑scoped monitors cannot detect attacks whose evidence is spread over multiple iterations. It introduces LoopHarness, a system that maintains a persistent, non‑decaying safety state across loops, bounding unauthorized actions with a constant that does not grow with the number of iterations. The authors provide a comprehensive evaluation protocol, including attacks that require cross‑iteration evidence, module ablations, and adaptive white‑box red‑team testing.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv:2608. 09828v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly work inside systems that govern how they delegate tasks, move information, execute actions, and use shared resources.
arXiv:2608.22752v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A safety rule and an episodic log compete for the same tokens in an AI agent's context. When the budget overflows, both are summarized at the same rate...
The paper investigates how tool‑using language‑model agents can safely commit changes to infrastructure when external state may change between read and commit. By distinguishing invalidating races from predicate‑preserving and irrelevant ones, the authors evaluate three commit‑time guard granularities—global epoch, read‑set version, and semantic commit predicate—using a deterministic simulator and three quantized model families. The study finds that only the complete predicate guard consistently eliminates unsafe commits, while freshness‑based guards block a large proportion of benign races and model‑side signals fail to replace precise semantic enforcement.
arXiv:2609.25686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-horizon assigned work requires an LLM agent to track the state of a task: which steps are done, blocked, cancelled, or open to repetition. Agent...
arXiv:2606. 08919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person.
A language model's memory can be worse than having no memory at all. Give a model a memory that kept a wrong conclusion but dropped the work behind it, and it emits that stale value as a confident answer; give the same model an empty memory and it abstains.
arXiv:2607. 08054v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trusted to draft the artifacts of safety analysis such as, losses, hazards, Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs), and safety constraints, inside rigorous processes such as Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA).