arXiv Machine Learning

DRIFT: Derailing Denoising Trajectories of Flow-Matching VLAs with Adversarial Patch Attack

arXiv:2608. 03207v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Flow-matching vision-language-action (VLA) models such as pi0 generate robot actions by integrating a learned denoising velocity field, and have been reported to resist adversarial perturbations that readily fool autoregressive VLAs.

Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 4

Let It Be Simple: One-Step Action Generation for Vision-Language-Action Models

Diffusion-based vision-language-action (VLA) models often inherit the image-generation view: actions are generated by iterative denoising. We argue that VLA action generation has a different condition-target structure: the policy is conditioned on rich observations, language, and state, but predicts only a compact, low-dimensional action chunk.

arXiv AI
Jun 11

Diffusion-based Cumulative Adversarial Purification for Vision Language Models

arXiv:2506. 03933v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in multimodal understanding, yet their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations poses a significant threat to their reliability in real-world applications.

By Jia Fu, Yongtao Wu, Yihang Chen, Kunyu Peng, Xiao Zhang, Volkan Cevher, Sepideh Pashami, Anders Holst
arXiv AI
Jul 21

RobustVLA: On Robustness of Vision-Language-Action Model against Multi-Modal Perturbations

arXiv:2510. 00037v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: In Vision-Language-Actionf(VLA) models, robustness to real-world perturbations is critical for deployment.

By Jianing Guo, Zhenhong Wu, Chang Tu, Yiyao Ma, Xiangqi Kong, Zhiqian Liu, Jiaming Ji, Shuning Zhang, Yuanpei Chen, Kai Chen, Qi Dou, Yaodong Yang, Xianglong Liu, Huijie Zhao, Weifeng Lv, Simin Li
arXiv Computer Vision
Sep 18

Beyond Patch Removal: Persistent Adversarial Effects in Vision-Language-Action Policies

Adversarial patches applied to Vision‑Language‑Action (VLA) policies not only corrupt actions immediately but also leave lasting state effects that persist after the patch is removed. The study introduces a state‑restoration protocol that evaluates recoverability after patch removal, distinguishing true adversarial impact from occlusion or action‑error magnitude. Experiments on OpenVLA‑OFT with EDPA attacks show that only 36.2% of episodes recover after five chunks, while controls recover at much higher rates; a recovery adapter can improve recovery but its effectiveness drops with delayed intervention.

By Enhao Wu, Fusen Guo, Yuxin Cao, Ziyang Lyu, Lin Li, Wei Song