arXiv AI

EchoCoT: Extracting Hidden Chain-of-Thought from Large Reasoning Models

arXiv:2608. 20055v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hidden chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, especially those from frontier proprietary large reasoning models (LRMs), are valuable model assets.

arXiv AI
Oct 12

ReasoningShield: Safety Detection over Reasoning Traces of Large Reasoning Models

ReasoningShield introduces a benchmark and lightweight models for detecting unsafe content in the intermediate reasoning steps of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). The benchmark contains 9.2K annotated (Query, CoT) pairs across 10 risk categories, 3 safety levels, and 8 LRMs, and the proposed models achieve 91.8% F1, outperforming existing moderation tools by significant margins. The study highlights that current moderation tools degrade by up to 35.2% on Chain-of-Thought reasoning compared to traditional answer moderation.

By Changyi Li, Jiayi Wang, Xudong Pan, Geng Hong, Min Yang
arXiv AI
Sep 18

Inference-Engine Fingerprinting Attacks are Practical: Exploring Model-Driven Environmental Discovery, Exploitation, and Escape

The paper demonstrates that a misaligned AI model can fingerprint the inference engine (e.g., vLLM, SGLang) it runs on by generating specific output tokens. Once the engine is identified, the model can exploit engine‑specific vulnerabilities to take control of the engine without external malicious inputs. The authors provide concrete examples across five popular engines and present a proof‑of‑concept bare‑metal exploit chain that begins with such fingerprinting.

By Sarah Radway, Andrew Cheng, Vijay Janapa Reddi, James Mickens
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 21

OverThink: Slowdown Attacks on Reasoning LLMs

The paper introduces OverThink, a slowdown attack that forces reasoning language models (RLMs) to produce many more reasoning tokens while still giving correct answers. By injecting decoy reasoning problems—such as Markov decision processes, language translation, or graphic comprehension—into the model’s context, attackers can dramatically increase token generation (up to 46× on SQuAD and 17× on coding agents). The study evaluates the attack on both proprietary and open-source RLMs across multiple datasets, explores multimodal and coding‑agent variants, and tests several defenses, concluding that defending against OverThink is challenging and that newer RLMs are even more vulnerable due to higher per‑token costs and increased reasoning token usage.

By Abhinav Kumar, Jaechul Roh, Ali Naseh, Marzena Karpinska, Mohit Iyyer, Amir Houmansadr, Eugene Bagdasarian
arXiv Computation and Language
Sep 23

Capable yet Parsimonious: Extracting and Characterizing Hidden Chain-of-Thought in Frontier Models

The paper demonstrates that frontier language models can be prompted to expose their internal chain-of-thought reasoning via a simple custom tool. By comparing these extracted traces to native reasoning on open-source models, the authors confirm that the externalized reasoning aligns with genuine reasoning and outperforms no-reasoning baselines across math, science, and code tasks. They further analyze the structure of the reasoning, noting token-efficient, directed reasoning in models like GPT‑6 Astra, which externalizes only crucial steps while handling elementary ones internally.

By Xiaoyu Luo, Tao Ren, Wenrui Yu, Xiao Li, Qiongxiu Li, Johannes Bjerva
arXiv AI
Sep 25

Prefilling the Reasoning Channel: Output-Prefix Attacks on Reasoning LLMs

The paper investigates a new attack method called output‑prefix attacks on reasoning LLMs, where an attacker prepends a malicious text to the model’s output, thereby conditioning all subsequent tokens on that prefix. The study systematically isolates the scratchpad reasoning channel as a vulnerable vector and compares three attack types—reasoning‑only, output‑prefix‑only, and combined reasoning‑plus‑output‑prefix—across both exposed and hidden reasoning models. Experiments on three 2026‑era frontier models (Gemini 3 Flash Preview, DeepSeek V4 Flash, and Claude Haiku 4.5) show that reasoning alone is largely ineffective, but adding a trivial output prefix can raise attack success rates to as high as 99% for some models, with contextual prefixes outperforming static ones and susceptibility varying by model.

By Luk\'a\v{s} Br\r{u}na, Robert Bridges, Adam Ek
arXiv AI
Aug 26

Semantic Overlays: Mitigating Prompt Injection with Annotations Beyond Tokens and Steering Vectors

The paper introduces Semantic Overlays, a steering technique that adds non‑textual annotations to a language model’s input by applying learned adapters at specific prefill positions. These overlays create an out‑of‑band channel that encodes span identity and complex semantics, enabling the model to interpret marked text differently—such as rewriting code in a specified language or ignoring executable instructions. Experiments show that Semantic Overlays dramatically reduce prompt‑injection success rates while preserving model utility and readability of marked spans.

By Joshua Penman