arXiv:2606. 25487v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade.
By Yang Gao (Veyon Solutions)
Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked.
arXiv:2607. 08065v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-as-judge (Zheng et al.
By Kaihua Ding
arXiv:2609.02899v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Benchmark contamination, the leakage of test items into training data, is widely described as a threat to the reliability of large language model (LLM)...
By Xingyao Xiao (Stanford University), Yihong Cheng (City University of Macau)
The paper introduces a new taxonomy for benchmark contamination that categorizes leakage by the mitigation it defeats—direct, derivative, temporal, distributional, and acquired—covering both training‑time and evaluation‑time scenarios. It proposes a four‑field disclosure protocol to record contamination status alongside benchmark scores, and provides a JSON schema, validator, and examples. An empirical study of 41 documents using a pre‑registered instrument shows limited reporting of contamination types and variable reliability, highlighting gaps in current disclosure practices.
By Johanna Angulo, V\'ictor Yeste, Hector Espinos-Morato
The paper audits the reproducibility of knowledge‑graph extraction from threat reports by re‑implementing matching rules for only five of twelve systems and re‑scoring ten system outputs under eight protocols. The audit shows that different matching protocols can reverse most pairwise system rankings and that a fixed prediction set can vary from 0.16 to 0.70 F1. The authors also build CTIForge to isolate validation effects, finding that validation changes precision across backbones and increases entity‑type disputes, and they release the full pipeline, protocol suite, and audit records.
By Safayat Bin Hakim, Houbing Herbert Song
The paper evaluates CASCADE, a fully local layered defense for Model Context Protocol (MCP)-based systems, by conducting a component ablation and corpus audit on a fixed 5,000-sample dataset. It demonstrates that the choice of aggregation convention heavily influences reported metrics, that detection performance varies with provenance, and that the released configuration does not fully disclose the operating point. The study also shows that a local review model invoked for a third of requests does not alter classification outcomes, highlighting the importance of reproducibility and transparency in defense evaluations.
By \.Ipek Abas{\i}kele\c{s} Turgut, Edip G\"um\"u\c{s}
TriShieldRAG introduces a three‑layered defense for Retrieval‑Augmented Generation: an Ingest Guard that screens documents, a Retrieval Scorer that re‑ranks based on trust, and a Cross‑LLM Consensus that validates evidence across three models. Against the original PoisonedRAG attack on the 2.68M‑passage Natural Questions corpus, the framework reduces attack success from about 79% to 1%. However, adaptive attacks that only alter document formatting can bypass the Ingest Guard and still achieve high success rates, revealing limits of layered defenses that rely on the same retrieved evidence.
By Susil Kumar Mohanty, Rohit Patel, Kosuru Yuvaraj, Jeenal Chaudhary, Disha Singhania
arXiv:2607. 17384v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper provides an experimentally verified formal law for calculating the uplift that diversity of thought provides in Large Language Model (LLM) ensembles.
By Junade Ali
arXiv:2607. 02104v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as cheap, scalable judges that compare candidate outputs pairwise -- to rank responses, select models, or triage papers.
By Jian Xu, Delu Zeng, John Paisley, Qibin Zhao
arXiv:2608. 15980v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Preference benchmarks are built by hiring annotators, and the identity of those annotators is treated as an implementation detail.
By Anik Jha
arXiv:2608. 02617v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We evaluate whether clinician pairwise preferences provide a reliable signal of clinical safety in large language model (LLM) evaluation using expert feedback from MOOVE (Massive Open Online Validation and Evaluation), a clinician-led platform collecting blinded pairwise preferences alongside multi-criterion rubric ratings.
By Fay Elhassan, David Sasu, Alexandra Kulinkina, Lars Henning Klein, Mary-Anne Hartley