CrossAudit proposes a Git‑native, cross‑vendor audit protocol for autonomous research pipelines, ensuring each work increment is reviewed by an agent from a different vendor against a human‑written rulebook. Audit outcomes, disputes, and rulings are stored as git commits, providing a replayable, versioned supervision history. The authors implemented the protocol with GitHub Actions and Python, deployed it in a computational‑chemistry pipeline, and conducted a seeded‑defect trial that revealed differing interpretations of the same rulebook by two vendors.
By Zhaohe Dong, Yuhao Chen
The paper introduces a claim‑anchored execution contract that binds a tool‑using agent’s emitted claim to its exact source span, the ordered execution prefix that produced it, and the source version and access state observed. Each receipt contains deterministic anchors, source identifiers, offsets, hashes, quotes, and a domain‑separated execution commitment, allowing a verifier to reconstruct these bindings before semantic or task labels are joined. The contract defines seven independently testable properties and demonstrates high detection rates against cross‑object attacks, with strong performance on conflict‑aware support guard evaluations.
By Miaobo Hu, Shuhao Hu, Xiaobo Guo, Xin Wang, Bokun Wang, Yina Sa, Daren Zha, Jun Xiao
arXiv:2609.10293v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: In high-stakes domains such as legal practice, a language-model answer is only useful to the extent that a reader can verify each claim against the sou...
By Chen Qian, Yimeng Wang, Yu Chen, Lingfei Wu, Andreas Stathopoulos
arXiv:2610.39468v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: AI coding agents now do long, multi-step and multi-session software work with little supervision. When a developer comes back to that work, the usefu...
By Mohammed Nayeem Khan, K S Sarun Kumar
The paper introduces ClaimReceipt, a specification and verifier that checks whether a claim in an agent evaluation can be recomputed from retained evidence (sufficiency) and whether the evidence covers the entire experiment set (coverage). Using the CR‑2 verifier on 1,392 historical records, the authors demonstrate accurate reproduction of audit verdicts, non‑redundant field groups, and zero false positives on semantic faults. In a prospective CR‑3 run, the system correctly flags missing receipts and preserves coverage when private evidence is withheld, while adding minimal overhead to inference time and transaction size.
By Peiying Zhu, Sidi Chang
The study examines whether commits made by AI coding agents can be distinguished from human commits when authorship signatures are removed. Using nearly 8 million commits from over a thousand repositories, the authors find that detectors can achieve a ROC AUC of up to 0.859, largely driven by message verbosity and change size rather than code content. However, precision remains low (≈0.332) and detection performance drops on held‑out agents, indicating limited reliability without explicit attribution.
By Kosei Horikawa, Hao Li, Yutaro Kashiwa, Youssef Esseddiq Ouatiti, Mohammed Sayagh, Bram Adams, Hajimu Iida, Ahmed E. Hassan
The paper reports that a model can pass fidelity checks—verifying that extracted values match the source—without actually opening a datasheet, due to a hidden constraint that disables tool use. To address this, the authors log every tool call in an agentic benchmark and develop two instruments: a rule‑based failure‑attribution classifier and a silent‑failure detector that flags runs based solely on which tools were invoked. While the detector shows low false positives on clean extractions and recovers all planted faults, its recall against correct tool usage but incorrect answers remains unmeasured, and a partial causal chamber confirms only a subset of claims, highlighting limitations in physical verification.
By Qing Ye, Meng-Hsuan Lin
arXiv:2606. 24429v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Generative AI coding agents are entering the open-source supply chain, yet their diverse and often invisible traces leave their prevalence poorly understood.
By Arsham Khosravani, Audris Mockus
arXiv:2609.08789v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Frontier AI developers publish safety frameworks that commit them to evidencing whether their models are dangerous. The European Union and California...
By Louis Yiven Zhu
arXiv:2608. 05204v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-agent ecosystems are rapidly growing around reusable skills: mixed-modality packages of metadata, natural-language instructions, code, tools, references, and operational workflows.
By Jialuo Chen, Minghe Wang, Lingqi Jiang, Jianan Ma, Xinhao Deng, Xiaohu Du, Ruixiao Lin, Yunhao Feng, Linkang Du, Jingyi Wang
The paper examines how AI‑written research papers often contain misattributed numerical claims. By re‑analyzing 540 judgments from a benchmark of nine AI agents on fifteen research problems, the authors manually labeled 256 claims and found that most failures stem from misalignment between the paper and the underlying work rather than outright cheating. They propose a deterministic claim‑to‑evidence checker that achieves over 90% precision and, when combined with an LLM verifier, offers a more reliable audit of AI‑generated research.
By Mosab Alfaqeeh, Omar Hourani, Muath Hourani, Hashem Alfaqeeh
Generative AI coding agents are entering the open-source supply chain, yet their diverse and often invisible traces leave their prevalence poorly understood. We introduce a multi-layered detection framework that integrates configuration-file scanning, commit-message analysis, author-identity matching, and bot-signature lookup across World of Code (180M+ Git repositories), classifying agent traces into four behavioral types.