arXiv:2605. 12991v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based multi-agent pipelines flip from correct to incorrect answers under simulated peer disagreement at rates we term yield, a vulnerability widely attributed to RLHF-induced sycophancy.
arXiv:2607. 16199v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly rely on a Planner to decompose goals into sub-task sequences that downstream Executor and Critic agents execute and audit.
arXiv:2606. 07532v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: RLHF-trained models are systematically biased toward agreement over accuracy, a structural property of the training process.
arXiv:2603. 19423v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks.
arXiv:2604. 08169v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be induced by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization.
arXiv:2607. 06503v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents solving multi-step tasks frequently commit to trajectories that are doomed to fail, yet continue to consume substantial inference compute before the failure becomes observable.
arXiv:2608. 03842v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: When a language model fails on surface-perturbed input (typos, OCR noise, homophones), "which layer is responsible" has three natural operationalizations: where representations diverge most (sensitivity), where restoring clean activations recovers the prediction (causality), and where a small adapter can repair the damage (compensatory capacity) - and we show these three layer maps dissociate.
arXiv:2606. 07532v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: RLHF-trained models are systematically biased toward agreement over accuracy, a structural property of the training process.
arXiv:2605. 08876v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that execute tool-augmented, multi-step tasks, where latency is a critical factor for real-world applications.
arXiv:2608. 02657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.
arXiv:2606. 01695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Adversaries can implant latent harmful behavior by poisoning as few as 1% of fine-tuning examples.
arXiv:2607. 19899v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Disagreement-triggered escalation can create a structural blind spot in multi-agent arbitration: as base learners improve, they tend to converge, weakening safety monitoring where correlated failures concentrate.
arXiv:2607. 01239v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Character-level perturbations bypass safety alignment in modern LLMs despite leaving prompts human-readable.