arXiv:2606. 05609v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are widely deployed, identifying their vulnerability through jailbreak attacks becomes increasingly critical.
arXiv:2506. 22666v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rise of API-only access to state-of-the-art LLMs highlights the need for effective black-box jailbreak methods to identify model vulnerabilities in real-world settings.
arXiv:2602. 06911v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks.
arXiv:2609.26185v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across many applications but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which elicit ha...
arXiv:2508. 10029v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations.
arXiv:2602. 12418v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks remain a persistent threat to large language model safety.
arXiv:2510. 02999v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Existing gradient-based jailbreak attacks on Large Language Models (LLMs) typically optimize adversarial suffixes to align the LLM output with predefined target responses.
arXiv:2503.06989v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Recently, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated their superior ability in understanding multimodal content. However, the...
arXiv:2512. 14751v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications.
arXiv:2606. 28962v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model quantization is essential for the efficient deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs), but introduces a critical vulnerability: Quantization-Conditioned Backdoor (QCB) attacks.
arXiv:2607. 19424v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The assessment of jailbreak attacks against large language models currently suffers from inconsistent evaluation criteria and methods, leading to unreliable estimates of attack success rates.
The paper introduces Fair-ASR, a protocol for evaluating black‑box jailbreak attacks using a shared target‑call budget, addressing the bias of prior studies that rely solely on attack success rate. Re‑evaluating 11 attacks under this protocol shows significant shifts in rankings and highlights that many methods are not efficient in both target and attacker calls. The authors then present ReCode, a budget‑efficient attack that combines desensitization rewriting with low‑cost primitives, achieving 85% ASR on GPT‑5 with only 7.19 attacker calls per request under a 20‑target‑call budget.