arXiv:2608. 04896v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Defensive driving scores are useful only when they preserve distinctions between policies that observe surrounding actors and those that do not.
Defensive driving scores are useful only when they preserve distinctions between policies that observe surrounding actors and those that do not. Re-simulation benchmarks may use reference-conditioned forgiveness, under which an agent receives credit when the logged human reference fails a compliance channel.
arXiv:2608. 15286v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce AgentRelBench, an environment-agnostic reliability instrument that computes ground-truth, severity-priced damage from database state diffs across repeated runs, with no LLM in the measurement path, demonstrated on EnterpriseOps-Gym.
arXiv:2608. 17713v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent evaluations and trace-based learning often compare outputs across transformed views through a post-response correspondence treated as neutral preprocessing.
arXiv:2606. 10154v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests.
arXiv:2608. 14711v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI coding agent benchmarks rank agents with the Chen et al.
arXiv:2607. 12469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many agent-safety evaluation results are not yet load-bearing evidence: identical nominal outcomes (task success, attack success, monitor scores) may sit atop materially different evidence regimes.
arXiv:2607. 20436v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations often assume that behavior observed during testing reflects behavior in ordinary use, but fine-tuning can break this assumption.
arXiv:2607. 07474v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic red-teaming benchmarks report whether an injected agent was compromised as a single bit: the attack succeeded, or it did not.
arXiv:2608. 08239v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM routers promise efficiency by matching each request to the cheapest adequate model, and are increasingly applied per step inside multi-step agents.
arXiv:2606. 10241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history.
arXiv:2608. 02786v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems can fail silently.
arXiv:2607. 19442v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Machine unlearning is commonly evaluated by matching a retrained oracle on trained probes.