Agentic Vulnerability Reasoning on COTS Binaries
arXiv:2605. 05000v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM agents have been increasingly adopted for solving security tasks.
Arbiter is a framework that uses formal evaluation rules and multi-model LLM scouring to detect interference patterns in system prompts for large language model (LLM) coding agents. Applied to Claude Code, Codex CLI, and Gemini CLI, it uncovered 152 findings in an undirected phase and 21 hand‑labeled interference patterns in a directed analysis. The study shows that prompt architecture correlates with failure class, multi-model evaluation reveals different vulnerability classes than single-model analysis, and a structural data loss issue in Gemini CLI was identified before Google’s patch addressed only the symptom.
arXiv:2605. 05000v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM agents have been increasingly adopted for solving security tasks.
arXiv:2608. 14863v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based coding agents have advanced rapidly on single-process SWE tasks, with frontier models now clustering in the high-70s on SWE-bench Verified.
arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...
arXiv:2609.00052v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Commercial LLM APIs advertise a specific foundation model, but the served backbone may be silently substituted, quantized, or wrapped, for example to...
arXiv:2601. 21233v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction.
arXiv:2606. 18619v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The advent of agentic vulnerability detection is already becoming a watershed moment for software security.
arXiv:2610.08405v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models have emerged as promising tools for software vulnerability analysis, but their effectiveness depends heavily on prompt design....
arXiv:2607. 08981v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-generated code often compiles, passes tests, and appears correct, yet breaks once deployed.
arXiv:2607. 01793v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform autonomous actions through external tools, leading to complex and evolving safety risks.
arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.
The paper introduces SecPRBench, a benchmark that evaluates large language model agents on real-world bug‑introducing commits from critical software systems such as Firefox, V8, and OpenSSL. It automates harvesting, building, and validating these commits, and uses an LLM‑as‑a‑judge to match findings with ground‑truth vulnerabilities. Across eight state‑of‑the‑art models, recall ranges from 32.5% to 78.1%, with Grok 4.6 and GPT‑6 sol performing best, while security‑focused harnesses like OpenAI’s Codex Security and Anthropic’s Defending Code influence recall differently.
arXiv:2607. 29422v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Automated vulnerability repair aims to reduce the time and effort required to patch security flaws from a vulnerability triage report.