arXiv AI

Arbiter: Detecting Interference in LLM Agent System Prompts

Arbiter is a framework that uses formal evaluation rules and multi-model LLM scouring to detect interference patterns in system prompts for large language model (LLM) coding agents. Applied to Claude Code, Codex CLI, and Gemini CLI, it uncovered 152 findings in an undirected phase and 21 hand‑labeled interference patterns in a directed analysis. The study shows that prompt architecture correlates with failure class, multi-model evaluation reveals different vulnerability classes than single-model analysis, and a structural data loss issue in Gemini CLI was identified before Google’s patch addressed only the symptom.

arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 10

VEX-Bench: Benchmarking LLM Agents for Assessing Exploitability of Software Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

arXiv:2609.08040v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The software supply chain has become an increasingly exposed attack surface because of its reliance on intricate yet fragile dependencies. Existing d...

By Jiahao Shi, Edward Tsien, Yifeng Di, Hongjiao Zhang, Yuan Tang, Ronit Dey, Ilona Shishov, Gal Netanel, Zvi Grinberg, Vladimir Belousov, Bat-Zion Rotman, Ilan Pinto, Tianyi Zhang
arXiv AI
Jun 18

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 18356v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using language-model agents introduce security failures that go beyond unsafe text: they can disclose protected objects, write persistent memory, send messages, modify databases, or trigger harmful code and tool effects.

By Yuchuan Tian, Mengyu Zheng, Haocheng Mei, Ye Yuan, Chao Xu, Xinghao Chen, Hanting Chen, Yu Wang
arXiv AI
Oct 27

Can Agentic Code Review Catch Vulnerabilities Before They Are Merged?

The paper introduces SecPRBench, a benchmark that evaluates large language model agents on real-world bug‑introducing commits from critical software systems such as Firefox, V8, and OpenSSL. It automates harvesting, building, and validating these commits, and uses an LLM‑as‑a‑judge to match findings with ground‑truth vulnerabilities. Across eight state‑of‑the‑art models, recall ranges from 32.5% to 78.1%, with Grok 4.6 and GPT‑6 sol performing best, while security‑focused harnesses like OpenAI’s Codex Security and Anthropic’s Defending Code influence recall differently.

By Yihan Yang, Chenyuan Yang, Zijie Zhao, Anh Nguyen Hoang, Ziqi Zhang, Weidong Wang, Zhiheng Lyu, Lingming Zhang