arXiv Computation and Language By Juan S. Santillana

VectraYX-Vision-1B: A Sub-2B Spanish/LATAM Cybersecurity Vision-Language Model with Structured Visual Reasoning and Native Tool Use

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The paper announces VectraYX‑Vision‑1B, a Spanish/LATAM cybersecurity vision‑language model that uses a natively‑trained visual tower (Qwen2‑VL) and a frozen decoder. The authors report that transplanting the visual tower improves the failing 8‑nibble address field from 0.00 to 0.81 exact, using a coarser token budget than 2×2 tiling, and that a second pre‑registered field shows 63% contamination and is demoted. The model’s B6/B7 tool‑id remains at floor, and code/checkpoints are available on Hugging Face.

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