arXiv AI September 7, 2026 By 10a Labs, :, Juliette Garcia, Hailey May, Bobby McKenzie, David Pham, Matthew Swain, Joshua Valdez, Corie Wieland, Zachary Yahn

Uncensored Open-weight Models: Redistribution as the Persistence Layer

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The paper documents a growing trend of removing safety guardrails from open-weight AI models, profiling the ecosystem that produces, redistributes, and applies these models. Between January 2024 and March 2026, 3,471 original uncensored models were identified on HuggingFace, each re‑packaged an average of 2.4 times, with three actors responsible for 52 % of all 8,164 compressed redistributions. After quantization and mirroring across platforms such as Ollama, these models persist even when upstream versions are removed, and 25 % of 1,643 GitHub applications that integrate uncensored large language models were classified as explicitly malicious.

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