arXiv AI
Sep 7

The History Is the Detector: Executing CVE Patch History, End-to-End

The paper introduces BUGSTONE‑E2E, a framework that converts vulnerability history into executable detection rules and validates them. It mines reusable rules from fixing commits, organizes them by CWE and language, and applies a funnel‑shaped pipeline that starts with lightweight analysis and culminates in LLM‑guided inspection, runtime verification, and patch generation. Using 19,325 high‑severity CVEs, the system identified 2,710 fixing commits, created 1,033 detection rules across 56 CWE families, and produced runtime evidence for 644 findings in 14 programs.

By Qiushi Wu, Kevin Eykholt, Youngja Park, Xiaokui Shu, Dhilung Kirat, Douglas Lee Schales, Ian Molloy
arXiv AI
Oct 9

Can LLMs Fix It Without Code? Toward Automated Verification of No-Code Bug Fixes

The paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can automatically verify no-code bug fixes—solutions that instruct users to change settings, upgrade versions, or alter workflows—by executing them in a real browser environment. Using 322 fixes from a benchmark, the study tests three executor agents (OpenCUA‑72B, Claude Sonnet 5, and Meta’s Muse Glimmer) and finds that only 17.6% of issues could be set up and passed sanity checks, with resolution rates ranging from 14.6% to 49.7% depending on the executor. Even the best configuration resolved fewer than half of the fixes, and executor choice significantly affected outcomes, highlighting the need for execution-based verification before such fixes reach users.

By Utku Boran Torun, Veli Karakaya, Eray T\"uz\"un
arXiv Machine Learning
Sep 29

What Do They Fix? LLM-Aided Categorization of Security Patches for Critical Memory Bugs

The paper introduces DUALLM, a dual-method pipeline that uses a Large Language Model and a fine‑tuned small language model to classify Linux kernel security patches with high precision. By analyzing commit titles, messages, diffs, and code context, DUALLM achieves 87.4% accuracy and an F1‑score of 0.875, outperforming existing methods. It successfully identified 111 recent patches addressing out‑of‑bounds or use‑after‑free vulnerabilities, with 90 confirmed true positives and proof‑of‑concept exploits demonstrating the validity of the classifications.

By Xingyu Li (UC Riverside), Juefei Pu (UC Riverside), Yifan Wu (UC Riverside), Xiaochen Zou (UC Riverside), Shitong Zhu (UC Riverside), Qiushi Wu (UC Riverside), Zheng Zhang (UC Riverside), Joshua Hsu (UC Riverside), Yue Dong (UC Riverside), Zhiyun Qian (UC Riverside), Kangjie Lu (UC Riverside), Trent Jaeger (UC Riverside), Michael De Lucia (UC Riverside), Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy (UC Riverside)