TUPLE-Bench: Evaluating and Mitigating Privacy-Utility Trade-offs in Typed Decision Models
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
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arXiv:2606. 18996v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agents are increasingly deployed in document-intensive workflows where sensitive private information is not an edge case but a routine input, e.
arXiv:2601. 17360v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: An adversary observing a model's released prediction can infer sensitive attributes of the queried input, or even reconstruct representatives of the model's training data.
PrivacyFlow introduces a new benchmark, PrivacyBench, and a defense system that separates privacy planning from task execution in autonomous LLM agents. The system traces data provenance, models recipient knowledge, and simulates inference attacks to weigh disclosure risk against task utility, allowing it to minimize or block data sharing. Experiments show that PrivacyFlow reduces privacy failures and increases completed task sequences by 22–55 percentage points, while revealing a tradeoff between privacy, utility, and user autonomy.
arXiv:2601. 14033v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Machine learning models are increasingly served behind APIs.
InferPriv is a new benchmark that evaluates inferential privacy leakage in large language model (LLM) assistants. It measures whether an honest-but-curious recipient can deduce a user’s sensitive attributes from an LLM’s reply during routine tasks, a type of leakage not captured by existing direct‑leakage benchmarks. Testing five frontier models, the study finds that inferential leakage rates (16.2–25.2%) far exceed direct leakage, even when direct leakage is near zero under privacy‑aware prompts.
Autonomous LLM agents executing multi-step workflows over personal data often misalign with user privacy expectations and leak sensitive, out-of-context information. Although Contextual Integrity (CI)...