arXiv:2608. 05715v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding.
By S. M . Bhagya P. Samarakoon, M. A. Viraj J. Muthugala, W. K. R. Sachinthana, Mohan Rajesh Elara
arXiv:2601. 09923v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior.
By Hanna Foerster, Tom Blanchard, Kristina Nikoli\'c, Ilia Shumailov, Cheng Zhang, Robert Mullins, Nicolas Papernot, Florian Tram\`er, Yiren Zhao
arXiv:2607. 08066v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring is a promising safety mechanism for AI agents, based on the premise that visible reasoning traces can surface misaligned or deceptive behavior.
By Jennifer Za, Julija Bainiaksina, Nikita Ostrovsky, Tanush Chopra, Victoria Krakovna
arXiv:2604. 23270v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a simple and effective way to elicit step-by-step solutions from large language models (LLMs).
By Shuxu Chen, Yitian Zhou, Jiaquan Zhang, Haoyu Bian, Wenrui Hu, Aming Wu, Sungyoung Lee, Chaoning Zhang, Hyundong Shin
arXiv:2608. 03231v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies promise general robotic manipulation, but their robustness against physical-world attacks remains fragile.
By Jinquan Zhang, Dongfu Yin, Run Yang, Yufeng Yan, Zhen Tian, F. Richard Yu
The paper proposes universal, tool‑based defenses for large language model agents that use external tools, addressing four types of adversarial attacks: direct and indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks. Two main defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, which restores the agent’s original toolset before planning. The authors also add prompt‑based defenses such as Chain‑of‑Thought prompting and self‑reflection, and demonstrate that these methods dramatically lower attack success rates—often to 0%—across multiple open‑source and proprietary LLMs while maintaining or improving task performance.
By Xiaoyan Li, Yunli Wang