arXiv AI
Aug 24

Vis-Poison: Poisoning Visual Knowledge in Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Vis-Poison is a novel attack that poisons multimodal retrieval-augmented generation systems by inserting attacker-controlled images as visual evidence, without altering any textual metadata. The attack uses an automated multi-agent approach to create visually plausible poisoned images and has been tested on two multimodal RAG pipelines, four embedding models, and six generation models. In black-box settings, Vis-Poison achieves an end-to-end success rate between 40.16% and 65.40% against 30,000-entry knowledge bases, and remains effective against various multimodal large language models with an average success rate above 60%.

By Rujin Liang, Zhongpu Chen, Yuhao Lei, Xin Miao
arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 14

Adjustable Text-Guided Backdoor Attacks with Natural-Word Triggers on Multimodal Pretrained Models

arXiv:2604. 05809v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper presents Text-Guided Backdoor (TGB), an adjustable backdoor attack against multimodal pretrained models that uses natural-word triggers, namely words that can naturally occur in ordinary textual inputs.

By Yiyang Zhang, Chaojian Yu, Ziming Hong, Yuanjie Shao, Qinmu Peng, Tongliang Liu, Xinge You
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30

RAGuard: A Layered Defense Framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems Against Data Poisoning

arXiv:2607. 26339v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems ground large language models (LLMs) in external corpora, but this reliance exposes them to corpus poisoning: maliciously injected passages that manipulate retrieved evidence.

By Pushkal Kumar, Tucker Nielson, Tanish Kolhe, Shubham Zala, Vincent Li
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 7

AEGIS: A Mechanism-Guided Defense against Visual Synonym Jailbreaks in Text-to-Image Models

Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved high visual fidelity and broad adoption, but remain vulnerable to safety violations when adversaries exploit them to synthesize illicit content. Existing alignment paradigms, from input sanitization to structural feature pruning, are largely organized around unsafe concepts explicitly exposed during filtering, editing, or localization.