arXiv AI By Xiaokang Qu, Jianliang Ma, Zao Fan, Tianshu Chu, Tianlong Fan, Linyuan L\"u

TopoIntent: Compiling Security Intent into Executable, Compliance-Checked Network Topologies

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arXiv:2608. 13389v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Enterprise security topology design requires translating business intent, regulatory requirements, and risk assumptions into zones, boundary devices, inter-zone paths, and access-control policies.

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