arXiv AI By Neeraj Karamchandani, Piyush Nagasubramaniam, Xinhong Xie, Sencun Zhu, Dinghao Wu

Threat-Preserving Representation Sensitivity in Agent-Security Benchmarks

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The paper introduces threat‑preserving representation sensitivity (TPRS) to assess how changes in agent‑visible wording affect attack success rates (ASR) while keeping the underlying task and evaluation criteria constant. Experiments on Agent Security Bench, MCPTox, and AgentDojo show that renaming threat‑related tools can significantly alter ASR—up to +13.21 percentage points on some models—yet may also degrade benign utility. The findings suggest that security scores based on a single representation may not generalize, urging robustness claims to be validated across multiple threat‑preserving representations.

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