arXiv:2606. 28639v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This article establishes the foundational mathematical limits of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) safety, proving that the core barrier is not the impossibility of an aligned state, but its structural unverifiability.
By Jose Pascual Gumbau Mezquita
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
By Seth Dobrin, {\L}ukasz Chmiel
arXiv:2606. 26406v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We propose a complete architectural blueprint for safe artificial general intelligence based on a closed reentry loop (D I cycle).
By A. S. Ushakov, Yu. N. Berdinsk
arXiv:2607. 13070v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment.
By Deepak Soni
arXiv:2607. 22868v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Runtime guardrails act before irreversible tool calls, but their guarantees depend on what policy state is representable, what a judge observes, and whether intervention changes future behavior.
By Shawn Ray
arXiv:2602. 20064v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results.
By Zac Garby, Andrew D. Gordon, David Sands