arXiv AI By Junru Zhu

SwarmSafe-Delta: Isolating Message Effects on LLM Agent Safety

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SwarmSafe-Delta is a paired executable protocol designed to isolate the impact of upstream messages on the safety of large language model (LLM) agents. By freezing upstream computation and varying real, hidden, and placebo message delivery, the protocol evaluates a single committed action against deterministic benign and risky policy states within preassigned budgets. Experiments across four models show that real message delivery increases risky-world violations and improves benign task success, while hidden delivery reduces risky outcomes, demonstrating that communication can both enhance utility and affect safety depending on message content and delivery method.

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