arXiv:2607. 16620v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Differential privacy (DP) is increasingly deployed to limit membership inference risk in machine-learning systems.
By Rakshit Naidu
arXiv:2606. 16952v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The rapid adoption of generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in synthetic data as a privacy-preserving alternative to sensitive real-world datasets.
By Kareem Amin, Rudrajit Das, Alessandro Epasto, Adel Javanmard, Dennis Kraft, M\'onica Ribero, Sergei Vassilvitskii
arXiv:2606. 08372v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Synthetic data is increasingly promoted as a privacy-preserving substitute for releasing sensitive tabular records, yet its central adversarial threat ("reconstruction", the recovery of an individual's hidden attribute values from a synthetic release and a handful of known quasi-identifiers) has been studied only in scattered, hard-to-compare settings.
By Steven Golob, Sikha Pentyala, Martine De Cock
arXiv:2606. 16952v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid adoption of generative AI and Large Language Models (LLMs) has spurred interest in synthetic data as a privacy-preserving alternative to sensitive real-world datasets.
By Kareem Amin, Rudrajit Das, Alessandro Epasto, Adel Javanmard, Dennis Kraft, M\'onica Ribero, Sergei Vassilvitskii
arXiv:2607. 13541v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: To overcome data scarcity and privacy constraints in data collection, it has become standard practice across academia and industry to augment real training data with text-to-image (T2I)-generated synthetic data, a paradigm we term Real-Synthetic Mix-Training (RSMT).
By Na Li, Boyu Kuang, Hongsheng Hu, Liquan Chen, Hyoungshick Kim, Yansong Gao, Anmin Fu
Conformal Privacy Auditing (CPA) is a distribution‑free framework that calibrates re‑identification risk for each released document against large language model (LLM)‑empowered adversaries. It outputs a conformal ambiguity set of candidate identities that is guaranteed to contain the true identity with a user‑chosen confidence level under exchangeability, along with an interpretable leakage proxy derived from the set size. CPA supports both logit‑access and sampling‑only attackers, enabling audits of both open‑source and proprietary models, and demonstrates calibrated coverage across various benchmarks and attacker configurations.
By Shuo Huang, Gholamreza Haffari, Xingliang Yuan, Ting Yu, Lizhen Qu