BekchiAI introduces a benchmark and platform for evaluating large language model agents. The benchmark comprises 13 tool‑using ReAct agents across seven task categories, totaling 2,057 deterministic test tasks with verifier‑checkable gold answers. The platform offers web‑based observability, token and latency telemetry, and remote run termination for live agents.
By Mesut Toruk
ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).
By Kai Wang, Zeming Wei, BiaoJie Zeng, Chang Jin, An Wang, Xiaokun Luan, Zhixiao Lin, Jingjing Qu, Xia Hu, Xingcheng Xu
arXiv:2608. 05144v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Long-horizon reasoning requires an agentic runtime that can persist when evidence supports its current approach and pivot when measurements reveal failure, hidden constraints, or a misspecified objective.
By Boxiu Li, Zimo Wen, Yijia Fan, Chuan Wen, Fan Yang, Hangxi Guo, Jiaao Wu, Jiachen Zhang, Junxiang Lei, Mukai Li, Ruize Tang, Runjing Gu, Shibo Hu, Sihan Chen, Sufeng Guo, Wanbo Zhang, Xian Zhang, Xiaoyu Chen, Xuanhe Zhou, Xuyao Huang, Yifei Gao, Yifei Shen, Yilin Chen, Yuheng Wu, Yuzhe Zhang, Zelong Zhao, Zhijie Deng
arXiv:2608. 05144v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-horizon reasoning requires an agentic runtime that can persist when evidence supports its current approach and pivot when measurements reveal failure, hidden constraints, or a misspecified objective.
By Boxiu Li, Zimo Wen, Yijia Fan, Junxiang Lei, Sufeng Guo, Jiaao Wu, Ruize Tang, Mukai Li, Yifei Shen, Xiaoyu Chen, Wanbo Zhang, Runjing Gu, Yifei Gao, Yuheng Wu, Xuyao Huang, Zelong Zhao, Jiachen Zhang, Shibo Hu, Hangxi Guo, Yilin Chen, Yuzhe Zhang, Fan Yang, Chuan Wen, Xian Zhang, Xuanhe Zhou, Zhijie Deng
arXiv:2607. 26791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities.
By Lehan Wang, Boli Chen, Ruixue Ding, Pengjun Xie, Jinwei Huang, Zhendong Liu, Shuo Wang, Tao Lei, Xin Ouyang, Xiaomeng Li
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney