arXiv AI By Abhinav Kumar, Rediet Abebe, Eugene Bagdasarian, Sahar Abdelnabi

SCARCE: Emergent Institutions in Long-Horizon Multi-Agent Coding Systems

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SCARCE (Shared Compute ARena for Coding agEnts) is a framework where autonomous agents tackle coding tasks with individual deadlines while negotiating shared resource access. The study observes that agents spontaneously form informal institutions—rules and commitments based on reputation, reciprocity, and precedent—that persist across tasks and influence resource allocation. A 21‑category taxonomy of negotiation strategies and emergent norms was developed to analyze eight models, revealing that newer frontier models exhibit more institutional behaviors, alongside exclusionary coalitions and rare divide‑and‑conquer tactics.

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