arXiv Computation and Language By Drishti Goel, Soorya Ram Shimgekar, Jeongah Lee, Violeta J. Rodriguez, Daniel S. Brown, Ravi Karkar, Koustuv Saha

Risk and Refusal: Mechanisms of LLM Responses to Suicidal Ideation

Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →

The study examines how eight instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs) handle suicidal ideation (SI) and self‑harm disclosures across three datasets, testing whether informing models of SI context or providing a clinician‑developed response protocol changes their behavior. Results show that baseline elevated risk in model responses is largely due to ignoring the disclosure and refusing to engage; informing models of SI or suppressing refusal increases engagement but does not reliably reduce risk and can even raise it. A clinician‑guided protocol, however, consistently lowers response‑level risk and reduces refusal, highlighting the importance of tailored safety mechanisms for SI contexts.

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