arXiv Computation and Language By Alexandr Goultiaev Tolstokorov, Kyriakos Mouratidis, Javad Dogani, Nikolaos Laoutaris

Rent-a-RAG: Embedding-Space Watermarks for Auditing Third-Party RAG

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The paper introduces DirBucket, a provider-side semantic watermarking system designed to audit document reuse in third‑party retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG) marketplaces. By embedding watermarks as meaning‑preserving paraphrases biased toward provider‑specific directions, DirBucket enables black‑box detection of unauthorized document reuse while maintaining retrieval quality. Experiments on mixed‑provider benchmarks show DirBucket consistently detects non‑compliance within 23 answers, resists adversarial laundering, and transfers effectively to real‑world corpora.

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Rent‑a‑RAG introduces DirBucket, a provider‑side semantic watermarking system that embeds documents with meaning‑preserving paraphrases biased toward secret directions, allowing black‑box auditing of document reuse in multi‑provider retrieval‑augmented generation (RAG). The method consistently detects non‑compliance on a challenging benchmark, achieving strong target detection with no false positives and surviving adversarial post‑answer laundering. DirBucket’s detection transfers unchanged to real‑world corpora in clinical, cyber‑threat‑intelligence, and legal domains, demonstrating that embedding‑space watermarking can make third‑party RAG document reuse statistically auditable.

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