The paper introduces the Post‑Audit Mirage, a framework showing that offline tests may not detect whether an agent update remains safe after deployment. It defines a benchmark that uses matched safe and harmful lifecycles to expose identical verifier‑visible evidence while an isolated scorer records opposite deployment truth, and presents a theorem on the error‑abstention tradeoff using observational equivalence. The IdentifiedRangeMonitor tool applies fresh group‑labelled harm outcomes to decide whether to deploy, hold, or remain uncertain, and experiments demonstrate that monitoring can recover missing distinctions in favorable settings but may stay undecided for rare groups or small effects.
arXiv:2607. 19449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Evaluation frameworks for tool-augmented LLM agents focus overwhelmingly on capability metrics or explicit tool crashes, leaving silent infrastructure failures and HTTP 200 responses with empty, null, or malformed payloads largely unaudited.
By Aarushi Singh
arXiv:2604. 05485v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: LLM agents call tools, query databases, delegate tasks, and trigger external side effects.
By Yi Nian, Aojie Yuan, Haiyue Zhang, Jiate Li, Li Li, Xiyang Hu, Hua Wei, Xiongye Xiao, Chaowei Xiao, Yue Zhao
arXiv:2609.00052v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Commercial LLM APIs advertise a specific foundation model, but the served backbone may be silently substituted, quantized, or wrapped, for example to...
By Xun Wang, Bihe Zhao, Michael Backes, Franziska Boenisch, Adam Dziedzic
arXiv:2607. 12469v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Many agent-safety evaluation results are not yet load-bearing evidence: identical nominal outcomes (task success, attack success, monitor scores) may sit atop materially different evidence regimes.
By Oleg Solozobov
arXiv:2610.16067v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Agent evaluation harnesses are software systems that run test suites, generate inputs, and decide outcomes with test oracles. This paper audits such...
By Junjie Chen