arXiv AI By Kashyap R Manjusha, Murali Emani

Poisoned Skills: Propagating Jailbreaks Through Agent Markdown Files

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The paper investigates whether Markdown skill files used to configure AI agents can serve as an injection channel for jailbreaks. By embedding a jailbreak into a LangChain-based question‑answering agent’s system prompt, the authors demonstrate that the attack success rate jumps from 0.5% under a benign prompt to an average of 45%, with some models reaching 68.9%. Two obfuscation techniques—zero‑width characters and phonetic transformations—do not outperform plain‑text injection, and the phonetic variant actually lowers success rates.

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