arXiv:2602. 24009v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak techniques for large language models (LLMs) evolve faster than benchmarks, making robustness estimates stale and difficult to compare across papers due to drift in datasets, harnesses, and judging protocols.
By Zhicheng Fang, Jingjie Zheng, Chenxu Fu, Wei Xu
arXiv:2604. 12616v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) expand the attack surface of safety-aligned systems by coupling visual perception with text generation.
By Jianhao Chen, Haoyang Chen, Hanjie Zhao, Haozhe Liang, Zheng Wang, Tieyun Qian
arXiv:2606. 11425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose persistent safety weaknesses in large language models (LLMs), but existing stateless single-turn methods face a trade-off: hand-crafted prompts are expressive but static, while iterative prompt optimization can adapt but often relies on low-level mutations that require many target queries.
By Ge Shi, Jun Yin, Donglin Xie, Fangyi Liu, Yucan Li, Menglin Liu
arXiv:2607. 17779v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Text-to-Image (T2I) generative models have achieved remarkable progress in synthesizing high-quality visual content, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial misuse, particularly in generating Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images.
By Dongdong Yang, Deyue Zhang, Zhao Liu, Zonghao Ying, Wenzhuo Xu, Jiankai Jin, Xiangzheng Zhang, Quanchen Zou
arXiv:2502. 09755v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety-aligned LLMs respond to prompts with either compliance or refusal, each corresponding to distinct directions in the model's activation space.
By Amit Levi, Rom Himelstein, Yaniv Nemcovsky, Avi Mendelson, Chaim Baskin
Tool-using LLM agents interact with the world through actions that persist state in artifacts (e. g.