arXiv Machine Learning By Kuangpu Guo, Qingyan Zheng, Jian Liang, Yongcan Yu, Zilei Wang, Ran He, Tieniu Tan

On the Vulnerability of Parameter-Level Defenses to Model Merging

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arXiv:2606. 30360v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The training-free integration of expert models via model merging has exposed significant security risks, enabling free-riders to combine specialized models without authorization.

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