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SpliTEE extends the split‑inference architecture of Slalom to large language models by protecting intermediate GPU computations with differential privacy rather than encryption. The authors show that masking intermediate representations is essential, as a prompt‑reconstruction attack can recover prompts with about 80% accuracy. Their global sensitivity analysis bounds the noise needed, and they demonstrate that SpliTEE on Intel TDX achieves near‑double the speed of fully CPU‑based inference and outperforms encryption‑based Slalom while maintaining higher accuracy.
arXiv:2609.15039v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: User prompts provided to large language models (LLMs) may contain private information. One way to protect them is to execute the LLM inside a...
TensorCommitments (TCs) is a lightweight, tensor-native proof‑of‑inference scheme designed to enable verifiable inference for large language models (LLMs). It binds each LLM inference to a commitment using multivariate Terkle Trees, ensuring that any tampering breaks the commitment. For the LLaMA2 model, TC adds only 0.97% overhead for the prover and 0.12% for the verifier, while improving robustness to tailored attacks by up to 48% compared to prior work that requires a verifier GPU.
TensorCommitments (TCs) is a lightweight, tensor-native proof‑of‑inference scheme that enables verifiable inference for large language models (LLMs) without requiring the verifier to rerun the model or possess a powerful GPU. By binding each inference to a commitment stored in multivariate Terkle Trees, TCs detect tampering with only a 0.97% overhead for the prover and 0.12% for the verifier on LLaMA2. The approach improves robustness against tailored LLM attacks by up to 48% compared to previous methods that needed a verifier GPU.
arXiv:2607. 29221v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We address the challenge of securely and efficiently outsourcing AI computations from a trusted but computationally weak client to an untrusted but powerful server, in the setting where the client holds both the input and the model, and the server must learn neither.
arXiv:2606. 09551v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Two-server secure inference allows a client to query a hosted large language model (LLM) without revealing prompts or embeddings.