arXiv:2505.15738v3 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Large language models are increasingly deployed in user-facing products that handle sensitive personal data while interacting with untrusted...
By Xiaoxue Yang, Bozhidar Stevanoski, Matthieu Meeus, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye
The paper introduces Semantic Overlays, a steering technique that adds non‑textual annotations to a language model’s input by applying learned adapters at specific prefill positions. These overlays create an out‑of‑band channel that encodes span identity and complex semantics, enabling the model to interpret marked text differently—such as rewriting code in a specified language or ignoring executable instructions. Experiments show that Semantic Overlays dramatically reduce prompt‑injection success rates while preserving model utility and readability of marked spans.
By Joshua Penman
arXiv:2605. 26595v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are often fine-tuned on uncurated text datasets that adversaries can poison.
By Zedian Shao, Charles Fleming, Teodora Baluta
The paper introduces LLM4Trust, a benchmark framework that evaluates large language models (LLMs) for trust assessment in cybersecurity. It constructs trust graphs to represent five fundamental trust properties, designs property‑understanding tasks, and tests eight LLMs across nine prompting strategies. The study identifies effective LLM‑prompt combinations, applies them to real datasets, proposes methods to handle context limits, and demonstrates that LLMs can understand trust properties while highlighting vulnerabilities and high inference costs, for which defense mechanisms and batch inference are suggested.
By Jie Wang, Yanbo Sun, Zheng Yan, Jiahe Lan, Elisa Bertino
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov