Lensless Gaze Is Not Private by Default: Auditing Identity Leakage Across Disclosure Surfaces
Read the original on arXiv Computer Vision →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computer Vision.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computer Vision.
The paper compares four audit methods for assessing identity‑level differential privacy in pre‑trained, black‑box face generators. Each method—GaussMech, KDE‑LR, MMD‑TV, and ROC‑HT—has distinct assumptions, hyperparameters, and finite‑sample limitations, and they produce markedly different epsilon estimates when applied to FaceFusion and InstantID. The study finds that all methods reveal significant identity distinguishability, but none can be reliably ranked in this high‑distinguishability regime, suggesting that future work should evaluate them on partially private mechanisms.
The paper investigates how different gaze data representations affect privacy and utility in extended reality (XR) systems. Three representations—raw gaze, spatial attention heatmaps, and engineered eye‑movement features—are compared using the HoloAssist dataset, evaluating action recognition accuracy and closed‑set user re‑identification. Engineered features preserve about 85% of action‑recognition performance while reducing re‑identification risk by roughly an order of magnitude, yet still leave some identity leakage, indicating that abstraction alone does not guarantee privacy.
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