Lazy Grounding: Attacking Search Agents with Factual Evidence
Read the original on arXiv Computation and Language →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computation and Language.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv Computation and Language.
arXiv:2607. 17291v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Deep research agents increasingly operate over the open web, where relevant records coexist with redundant summaries, outdated reports, and misleading documents.
arXiv:2608. 10676v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based search agents answer questions through multi-step interactions with external environments.
arXiv:2608. 04565v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking.
arXiv:2606. 22737v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Before letting an agent operate over real context, can you prove it used the right evidence?
Large language model (LLM)-based search agents answer questions through multi-step interactions with external environments. However, providing complete execution trajectories to the LLM causes unbounded context growth and introduces noise.
arXiv:2606. 05241v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Public benchmarks enable fair and reproducible evaluation of LLM reasoning, but they become fragile for deep research agents that actively search the web during inference.