KONTOGRAPH: Verified Point-in-Time Feature Consistency and Amortised Explanation for Real-Time Anti-Money Laundering under a 200 ms Decision Budget
Read the original on arXiv AI →The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
The Flow has not summarised this story yet — read it at arXiv AI.
Regulation (EU) 2024/886 obliges European payment service providers to settle euro credit transfers in under ten seconds, around the clock. This removes both the overnight batch window in which anti-m...
FinalityBench is an executable benchmark that tests how agents decide on shipping, re‑capturing, refunding, or waiting when a merchant’s payment processor, ledger, ERP, and bank feed receive delayed, duplicated, dropped, or reordered messages, causing contradictory beliefs about an order. The benchmark uses a hidden canonical event log and faulted delivery streams to generate system views, scoring each episode by the merchant’s terminal economic position relative to a privileged reference. It contains 321 tasks, including 45 twin pairs where all four views are identical yet the correct disposition differs, and evaluates nine programmatic policies, revealing that a ship‑on‑first‑sign policy performs best by accuracy but worst by paired loss, while a runtime‑gated irreversible‑action policy achieves 85.4% accuracy without losing money.
The paper presents a graph‑based method for detecting money‑mule accounts by treating a bank’s relational schema as a heterogeneous graph and scoring each account using multi‑hop neighbourhoods, per‑column encoders, relative‑time encoding, and HeteroGraphSAGE message passing. On a five‑year RBIH retail‑banking dataset of 400 million transactions, the model achieves 83 % precision and a 0.5 % false‑alarm rate, recovering nine out of ten held‑out mules and outperforming tree‑based baselines in recall while maintaining precision deep into the alert queue. The approach can be deployed directly on a bank’s existing database without constructing a custom feature graph.
Money-mule networks move criminal funds through many small transfers, each of which looks ordinary on its own. What marks an account as a mule lies outside any single transfer: in the counterparties a...
arXiv:2604. 17420v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Money laundering poses severe risks to global financial systems, driving the widespread adoption of machine learning for transaction monitoring.
arXiv:2602. 03981v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Credit exposure in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is often implicit and token-mediated, creating a dense web of inter-protocol dependencies.