The paper demonstrates that open‑ended Theory‑of‑Mind trackers can produce valid beliefs that are absent from finite reference sets, and that treating unmatched outputs as false can reverse model‑selection rankings. By recoding references for 259 beliefs, the authors show a dramatic drop in weighted prevalence and a reversal of strictly proper Brier risk, with similar distortions observed in a 301‑question NQ‑open DPR‑BERT pipeline. The study further reveals that 90‑96% of audited unmatched beliefs are literally true, and introduces a TriSource‑Restore method that anchors reference labels to a probability‑sampled human pilot to restore calibration and ranking integrity.
By Zhexi Feng, Wuxi Chen, Bingrui Zhang
The paper audits a 366‑day autobiographical book generated by a large language model (LLM) against an independent verification corpus. Using a four‑level rubric, 354 of the 366 days (96.7%) failed verification, with only 12 days containing corroborated scenes and 19 days containing actively contradicted claims. Regenerating the same days with current models yielded 100% verification failure, while grounding the generation in the subject’s own corpus improved the rate to 83.3% but still left substantial residual failure.
By Heather Renze
arXiv:2609.25447v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We study what LLMs do when a user applies pressure in an uncomfortable situation: a user insists, begs, flatters or grieves, and the model gives up a c...
By Tapan Parikh
arXiv:2606. 10315v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-as-judge is the default instrument for evaluating conversational agents, yet its reliability is almost always reported as agreement with human ratings, not recall of real defects.
By Sawyer Zhang, Alexander Wang, Sophie Lei
arXiv:2608.31016v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Ambient AI scribes draft clinical notes, and published audits find their dominant error is omission: information the encounter established that the n...
By Sebastian Fox, Luke Markham, Ryan Lail, Michael Karotsieris
Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model prompted to grade. The judge is rarely checked.