arXiv:2607. 10936v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study the bandit-feedback version of online principal component analysis (Bandit PCA): in each round $t = 1,\dots,T$, the adversary selects a $d \times d$ symmetric gain matrix $G_t$ with spectrum in $[0,1]$ and rank at most $r$; the learner simultaneously selects a unit vector $w_t \in S^{d-1}$ and receives the reward $w_t^\top G_t w_t$.
By Mo\"ise Blanchard, Dmitrii Ostrovskii, Aadirupa Saha
The paper studies high‑dimensional linear contextual bandits with knapsack constraints (CBwK), aiming to exploit sparsity for tighter regret bounds. It introduces an online hard‑thresholding estimator integrated into a primal‑dual framework, achieving sub‑linear regret that grows only logarithmically with the feature dimension. Under either a diverse‑covariate or margin condition, the regret improves to τ‑dependent rates, and when both hold simultaneously, a dual resolving scheme yields an even tighter bound. The approach also recovers optimal rates for high‑dimensional contextual bandits without knapsacks, and experiments demonstrate its practical effectiveness.
By Wanteng Ma, Dong Xia, Jiashuo Jiang
arXiv:2606. 29252v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter.
By Negin Golrezaei, Sourav Sahoo
arXiv:2606. 31449v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We investigate the contextual slate bandit problem with generalized linear rewards under limited adaptivity.
By Tanmay Goyal, Sukruta Prakash Midigeshi, Gaurav Sinha
arXiv:2608. 04324v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper studies generalized low-rank matrix bandits with multiple prioritized objectives.
By Bo Xue, Ji Cheng, Haodong Jing, Hongzong Li, Shuang Qiu
We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $α$ times payment, where $α\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$.