arXiv:2608. 12962v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) enables organizations holding complementary features of shared entities to collaborate and train models.
By Ziqi Zhao, Jialin Lu, Junjie Shan, Junyuan Zhang, Shuya Yang, Ka-Ho Chow
arXiv:2606. 12896v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While real-world applications of reinforcement learning (RL) are becoming increasingly popular, the security of RL systems deserve more attention and exploration.
By Junfeng Guo Heng Huang
arXiv:2604. 10062v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We study reward poisoning attacks in reinforcement learning (RL), where an adversary manipulates rewards within constrained budgets to force the target RL agent to adopt a policy that aligns with the attacker's objectives.
By Jose Efraim Aguilar Escamilla, Haoyang Hong, Jiawei Li, Haoyu Zhao, Xuezhou Zhang, Sanghyun Hong, Huazheng Wang
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
By Anthony Hughes, Nicole Xing, Collin Francel, Andy Kim, Andrew Draganov
arXiv:2510. 05159v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: While finetuning AI agents on interaction data -- such as web browsing or tool use -- improves their capabilities, it also introduces critical security vulnerabilities within the agentic AI supply chain.
By L\'eo Boisvert, Abhay Puri, Chandra Kiran Reddy Evuru, Nazanin Sepahvand, Nicolas Chapados, Quentin Cappart, Jason Stanley, Alexandre Lacoste, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham, Alexandre Drouin
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.