arXiv Machine Learning By Toshif Khan (Minot State University), Muhammad Abusaqer (Minot State University)

Empirical Evaluation of Data Poisoning Attacks in Supervised Learning

Read the original on arXiv Machine Learning →

The paper evaluates two training‑time data poisoning attacks—label flipping and backdoor poisoning—on MNIST and Fashion‑MNIST using Logistic Regression, Linear SVM, and Random Forest classifiers. Label flipping degrades performance most for Logistic Regression and Linear SVM, while Random Forest remains relatively stable. Backdoor poisoning achieves near‑perfect attack success rates across all models while largely preserving clean‑test accuracy, highlighting the stealthy nature of targeted backdoors.

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