arXiv AI
Dual-Modality Multi-Stage Adversarial Safety Training: Robustifying Multimodal Web Agents Against Cross-Modal Attacks
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Defending against Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks via Reasoning-enabled Task Alignment
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
Hugging Face Trending Papers
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Defending against Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks via Reasoning-enabled Task Alignment
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.
arXiv Machine Learning
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CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinement
The paper introduces CoER, a framework that defends language‑model agents against adaptive indirect prompt injection (IPI) by employing attacker‑defender co‑evolution and refinement. CoER models IPI as a general‑sum Markov game, uses Co‑PPO to maintain historical opponent populations, and fine‑tunes defenders only on verified safe demonstrations. In experiments across seven domains, CoER cuts attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% while boosting task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%.
arXiv AI
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Dual-Adversarial Safety Alignment: Cultivating Intrinsic Threat Comprehension in LRMs
arXiv:2608. 09542v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve remarkable success on complex tasks but remain vulnerable to harmful prompts that induce unsafe outputs.
arXiv AI
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Render Before Reading: Visual Rendering as a Prompt Injection Defense
The paper investigates how multimodal large language models are more susceptible to prompt injection when adversarial instructions are presented as text rather than as non-textual inputs like images. It proposes a training‑free defense that renders untrusted payloads into typographic images (or audio) before they reach the model, a method called Pictionary. Experiments on ten models and two benchmarks show that this approach significantly lowers attack success rates while maintaining normal functionality, and that fine‑tuning on image‑rendered instructions can further reduce the modality gap.
Hugging Face Trending Papers
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Investigating Adversarial Robustness of Multi-modal Large Language Models
Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong performance on vision-language tasks, but incorporating visual inputs through a vision encoder (e. g.